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formally beginning their effort to gain political legitimacy. In a ma-
neuver to build trust, President Mahinda Rajapaksa commissioned 
a truth and reconciliation study with the goal of building peace for 
the future. The TNA has become the unequivocal voice of the Tam-
il population, the largest ethnic minority on the island. As support 
among the Tamils shifts from the Tamil Tigers to the TNA, the Tamil 
population now fights the Sinhalese majority through the ballot box 
instead of on the battlefield.
The Tamil minority scored a decisive victory with the results of the 
recent provincial poll. Unable to gain political or military recogni-
tion throughout the civil war, they have at last found a way to voice 
their concerns. Gone are the Tamil battle cries for independence; 
now they simply seek a modicum of self-rule through a federal sys-
tem.The vote acts as a guide to discovering what the Tamils do not 
want. Various attempts by the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party to 
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Can rebel opposition movements suc-
ceed politically after surrender? The Lib-
eration Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
known as the Tamil Tigers, want to prove 
that the shift from violence to governance 
can be successful. This September, the 
political proxy of the former rebel sepa-
ratist movement, the Tamil National Al-
liance (TNA), won a landslide victory in 
the first provincial poll taken in northern 
Sri Lanka in 25 years. TNA’s contestation 
of the provincial poll proved a spectac-
ular success:  30 of 38 members elected 
to the provincial council belonged to the 
TNA.  The political group believes that 
they now have a clear democratic man-
date to represent the minority Tamil eth-
nic group. Yet, the path toward eventual 
Tamil governance appears riddled with 
pitfalls. For them to succeed, bargaining 
and negotiation  between the two large 
political parties in the war-torn nation 
must progress further. 
Five years ago, the possibility of peaceful 
elections seemed unattainable. The rebel 
Tamil Tigers were fighting to gain an in-
dependent state encompassing sections 
of the north, the ancient homeland of 
Tamil Eelam, from whom the rebel group 
derives its name. Velupillai Prabhakaran, 
the founder and spiritual leader of the 
Tigers, continued to order suicide bomb-
ings against the Sri Lankan army to break 
the spirit of the Sinhalese majority. The 
fighting exhausted both sides. The war 
cost an estimated 200 billion USD and 
between 80,000-100,000 casualties over 
a quarter century. Prabahakaran’s death 
in May 2009 brought an end to the war; 
most Tamils could only muster resolve 
to resist the military regime in Colombo 
from his unwavering spirit.
What a difference a few years can make, 
even in long-standing conflicts. The reel-
ing LTTE agreed to a ceasefire and po-
litical rapprochement in August 2009, 
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restore critical infrastructure since the end of the civil war have been 
unpopular among the Tamils. The government has attempted to pla-
cate the masses through economic development; roads, ports, and 
hospitals have come to the north, restoring what was destroyed in 
the bloody civil war.
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    How much power does the TNA-dominated provincial council 
wield? With more than 75% of council seats won by the TNA, the 
Tamil voice will certainly be present in its recommendations to 
the central government. Yet even with a majority in the provincial 
council, the Tamils must still convince the national government, 
which legally controls the province through an appointed gover-
nor, that their voice should be considered legitimate. The mem-
bers of the provincial council make local decisions, yet they are 
subject to budgetary appropriations from the governor, who also 
holds the right to reject decisions made by the provincial council. 
Rajapaksa and his Sri Lanka Freedom Party are leery of granting 
too much control to the TNA, which still favors autonomy in the 
Northern Province. 
Rajapaksa can validate the residual skepticism of the Tamil mi-
nority by denying the provincial council a strong voice in daily 
affairs. On the other hand, the government has a proven track re-
cord of reconstructing the devastated Northern Province. Even so, 
the Tamils do not trust the Sinhalese to govern. The violence and 
war crimes wrought by government armed forces remain fresh in 
the minds of those affected. A winning government strategy to en-
sure national cohesion may be to grant legitimacy to the council’s 
decisions. The TNA will face initial political struggles, as do most 
parties at the inception, but they will ultimately learn how to man-
age the region.
The leader of the TNA, C.W. Wigneswaran, remains optimistic 
for the future of peace in the north. While winning more than 
75% of the seats on the provisional council, the TNA won 81% 
of the popular vote despite armed soldiers guarding the voting 
booths, regarded by some as a government intimidation tactic. 
Wigneswaran believes these numbers are proof that Tamils have 
put their faith in a political struggle, rather than a military one. 
His plea to President Rajapaksa? “They [the Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party] must trust us.” 
Despite a successful election with no reported violence, peace in 
Sri Lanka rests in a precarious position. Neither side trusts the 
other, while each claims  the right  to govern the formerly war-torn 
Northern Province, further jeopardizing the possibility of peace. 
Yet, even in this environment of profound distrust, the successful 
implementation of a free election has nudged Sri Lanka down the 
path toward future success. Neither the West nor the Sri Lankan 
government should discount the TNA’s chances of gaining politi-
cal relevance; their proficiency at working the democratic levers to 
gain legitimacy cannot be denied.  
“The TNA won 81% of the popular vote, despite armed 
soldiers guarding the voting booths, regarded by some as 
a government intimidation tactic.”
